Introduction
Palestinian rights, a critique proposed for decades (e.g. Shehadeh, 1985; Shamir, 1990; Sultany, 2014; Weill, 2015) . David Kretzmer (2002: 2-3) has suggested that 'the main function of the Court has been to legitimize the government's actions in the Territories', both when the ISC/HCJ sides with the state authorities, and when it opposes them (also Shamir, 1990 ); as such, it plays a crucial role in maintaining and upholding the occupation (Kretzmer, 2002; Al-Haq, 2010; Harpaz and Shany, 2010: 515) alongside military courts (Dinstein, 2009: 132; Arai-Takahasi, 2009: 145-166) .
The framework that underpins the Khan-al-Ahmar case is the ISC/HCJ's judicial review over the actions of state agents, which from the early days of the occupation has extended outside Israeli sovereign territory to cover military activities in Palestine (Kretzmer, 2002: 1; 19-21) . The ISC/HCJ's jurisprudence has
given Palestinians the possibility to petition against actions carried out by the Israeli military or under the aegis of the military (Shamir, 1990: 785; Dinstein, 2009 : 25-26, Weill, 2015 . But the court has also extended this right to Israelis in Palestine: based on a widely criticised interpretation of Art 43 of the Hague
Regulations, it considers Israeli settlers part of the 'local population' (Kretzmer, 2002: 65) , distorting the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) and disregarding the illegality of transferring parts of the occupying power's population to occupied territories (Art 49(6) Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV)).
Reflecting on the significance of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, this article considers The Khan-al-Ahmar case provides an illustration of how law, and in particular trials, helps mask political abuse in how Israel deals with Palestinian matters. The legalistic nature of the Israeli occupation was widely discussed at the 1988 Al-Haq conference in Jerusalem (Playfair, 1992: 205 Allo (2016) , and the structural challenges of legal resistance in this context (Weizman, 2016) . Using legal procedure for political ends is a widespread phenomenon (Kirchheimer, 1961 ) not exclusive to the context of Israel/Palestine. Indeed, judicial rituals -including high court trialsmask deeper social functions of law: official procedures carry the 'potential to dehumanize persons through the use of conceptual legal masks', camouflaging the 'human significance' and gravity of certain acts through the illusion that 'legal reasoning will remain on a level of neutral abstraction' (Weyrauch, 1978: 699-670) .
In other words, using legal proceedings to bolster the Israeli grip over Palestine is a more sophisticated tool of control and oppression than the use of military might. 
A Regime of Soft Boundaries
For the purpose of this study, the 1967 Green Line provides an indication as to what can be understood as Israel and as occupied Palestine, though neither party has formally accepted these borders. Yet crucially, the reality on the ground does not lend itself to a clear distinction between the two political entities. There are unanswered questions as to the Israeli political willingness to let go of the West Bank; some scholars have alluded to the hope of part of the Israeli population to absorb the Palestinian territories, following the East Jerusalem model of unilateral annexation (Ratner, 2005: 700) . Kretzmer (2002: 19) has summarised this ambiguity stating that 'over the years Israeli governments pursued policies aimed at integration of the Occupied Territories with Israel while refraining from formally annexing the West Bank'. International law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict, has been used to facilitate Israeli control over the West Bank, giving rise to a 'legal hypocrisy' (Kretzmer, 2013) (Weill, 2015 , Sultany, 2014 , Kretzmer, 2002 , Harpaz and Shany, 2010 , the Israeli judiciary has substantially contributed to the situation. More generally, observers outside law have spoken of 'ethnocratic expansionism' by Israel over Palestine and Palestinians (Yiftachel, 2006: 3-9) . Writing at the same time, Playfair (1992: 223-224 ) echoed the concern that although 'the occupying power has the right to carry out many actions, including some which would otherwise be in violation of international law' to safeguard its security, those actions have come to embrace every aspect of Palestinian life.
These considerations remain pertinent today, and can be contrasted with the treatment of settlers in the West Bank. Israeli settlers enjoy preferential treatment as nationals of the occupying power, namely through application of domestic civilian Israeli law extraterritorially to them, while Palestinians in the same territory are subject to military law. Moreover, as Weill (2015: 13) has remarked, the 'needs of the settlers have been legally translated as a security issue', which results in strengthening their claims before the ISC/HCJ.
From Occupation to a Permanent Regime of Legalised Control
The ICJ has confirmed that Palestine -including the West Bank in its entirety -is considered under military occupation, and as such is governed by the Hague Convention and Regulations of 1907, as well as GCIV, as widely discussed in the literature (Imseis, 2003; Imseis, 2005; Kretzmer, 2005) . The Wall Case also extended human rights obligations (including the ICCPR) to Israeli actions in Palestine, alongside the IHL duties of the occupying power. Yet the laws of military occupation that set out a temporary and exceptional regime of control over an occupied territory and population (Roberts, 1984; Greenwood, 1992; Sassòli, 2005; Benvenisti, 2012) become inadequate in the context of a prolonged and normalised situation of control (Roberts, 1990; Falk, 1989) .
The classic view that 'occupation does not transfer sovereignty' but only authority to govern temporarily presents occupation and annexation as distinct and 'mutually exclusive' legal concepts (Pellet, 1992: 174-175) . This dichotomy has been convincingly rejected by Martti Koskenniemi (2008: 32-35) Like a sovereign dictatorship, transformative occupation exceeds the legal order that authorizes its provisional assumption of control. (Bhuta, 2005: 738) As the temporary military nature of the occupation fades, and a new order backed by permanent civilian judicial oversight is put in place by the occupying power to maintain control over the occupied territories and population, the overall picture Two parallel legal regimes have been created for the two groups. Israeli settlers fall under ordinary Israeli civilian justice (Kretzmer, 2013; Gordon, 2008) . In contrast, the administration of justice for Palestinians is through the Israeli military courts, in what has been described as a 'process of judicial domination' of the West Bank (Weill, 2007; Hajjar, 2005) . In addition to the military courts and the residual Palestinian administration of justice over Palestinian-only disputes in Areas A and B, overall judicial oversight in the West Bank is exercised by the ISC/HCJ, a function described as 'a central feature of Israel's legal and political control over these territories' (Kretzmer, 2002: 1) . The ISC/HCJ's 'power to determine whether or not certain actions of the occupant serve the interest of the local population or are at any rate beneficial to such population' has been long criticised (Cassese, 1992: 439-440 ). Already at the 1988 Al-Haq conference in Jerusalem Antonio Cassese (1992) had argued that the court was not in a strong position 'for determining whether or excluded. Yet as recalled by Shehadeh (1992 : 165) Military Order 1213 (1987 granted the status of 'local residents' to settlers, an interpretation that had found favour in the ISC/HCJ jurisprudence since the 1970s (Kretzmer, 2002: 64-65) . This gives the action a legal seal of approval and makes it possible to keep doing it under the restrictions set by the Supreme Court. (Alexandrowicz, 2011: 56'51'') This quote highlights the special relationship between the ISC/HCJ and the military. And throughout the documentary, the extent to which this institutional complicity compromises the neutrality and impartiality of the ISC/HCJ in adjudicating over Palestinian issues remains a lingering question.
A striking example of the continuum between the executive, the military and the ISC/HCJ is provided by the enforcement of the Israeli zoning and planning regime in Area C (Diakonia, 2013). The system in place provides extremely limited consultation opportunities for Palestinians affected, but it is open to settler committees as noted in studies since the 1980s (Rishmawi, 1992: 292; Home, 2003) . Under this regime, if a structure does not have the proper Israeli permit, it is likely to be given a demolition order, often justified on security grounds.
Historically the requisition of Palestinian land supported by ISC/HCJ judgments has been used as a means to facilitate settler expansion (with some exceptions) (Playfair, 1992: 223-229) . For a long time security justifications have facilitated the preservation and the expansion of Israeli hold over the West Bank, regardless of the IHL protections afforded to the local Palestinian communities (Playfair, 1992: 229-230) . This strategy has not changed over the past three decades, as the Khanal-Ahmar case demonstrates.
An international fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council 
The Jurisdiction over Khan-al-Ahmar
The exercise and modalities of jurisdictional oversight by the ISC/HCJ over the West Bank emerging from the case of Khan-al-Ahmar typify the entrenchment of Israeli power over Palestinians. The dispute focused on the lack of planning permission for the Bedouin school, the basis of the demolition order. According to the petitioning Kfar Adumim settlers, the failure to demolish the school violated their private property, as they planned to expand their settlement to the Khan-alAhmar site. In its response, the Ministry of Defence, with whom the ISC/HCJ eventually sided, stated instead that the school fell on Israeli state land, which was not privately owned by the settlement and dismissed claims that Kfar Adumim had any property rights over that area. There was no mention of the rights of the Bedouin community to live in their village and keep their community school. The
Bedouins were marginalised in the proceedings and silenced in the final hearing.
Their fate was decided in a foreign court, in a foreign language, in a dispute they were not directly party to.
As Khan-al-Ahmar falls within Area C of the West Bank, it is subject to the Israeli planning regime (Diakonia, 2013). All building activity as well as structural The residents of Khan-al-Ahmar are members of the Jahalin tribe, a Bedouin group from the Negev desert (now within Israel) who fled to the West Bank after 1948 (Jamjoum, 2008 (Jamjoum, /2009 NRC, 2015) . Many Negev Bedouins in the West Bank hold refugee status under international law, providing an additional layer of protection (UNRWA, 2013) . Israeli plans to move these communities amount to transfer of civilians, described by one author 'an effective means to secure the fruits of conquest or aggression to the detriment of the civilian population' (Meindersma, 1994: 31) . The transfer of Bedouins from one location to another in the West Bank raises serious questions around the issue of forced displacement, (Falah, 1985; Falah, 1989; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2003; Nasasra, Richter-Devroe, Abu-Rabia-Queder and Ratcliffe, 2014) . decision not to adjudicate on the grounds that the Israeli authorities were actively pursuing alternative solutions at political level to relocate the Bedouin community from Khan-al-Ahmar to Nweimeh (close to Jericho) (Hass, 2014) , where more adequate infrastructure and educational facilities would be provided. The Bedouins of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, however, enjoyed little political agency in this process, while being subject to the decisions of the Israeli judiciary and politicians.
Jurisdiction over Settlement Activity
The subject-matter of the dispute goes beyond the demolition of the tyre school in The relationship between the IDF (and the Israeli authorities more generally) and the settlers has been sometimes described as 'symbiotic' (Peled, 2012: 87) 
